An analytical model of a team of well-trained human de cisionmakers executing a well-defined decisionmaking task is presented. Each team member is described by a two-stage model consisting of a situation assessment (SA) and a response selection (RS) stage. An infor mation theoretic framework is used, in which bounded rationality is mod eled as a constraint on the total rate of internal processing by each decisionmaker. Optimizing and satisficing strategies are derived and their properties analyzed in terms of organizational performance and individual workload. The results are applied to the analysis of two three-person organizational designs.
I. INTRODUCTION
A command control and communications (C 3 ) system is de fined as the collection of equipment and procedures used by commanders and their staff to process information, arrive at decisions, and communicate these decisions to the appropriate units in the organization in a timely manner. Implicit in this definition is the notion that the role of the human decisionmaker is central to the design of organizations and the C 3 systems that support them. A basic model of an interacting decisionmaker, appropriate for a narrow but important class of problems, was introduced by Boettcher and Levis [1] . In this correspondence, the methodology is extended to the analysis and evaluation of teams with acyclical information structures. Two three-person organizations are used to illustrate the approach.
The basic assumption in designing organizations is that a given task, or set of tasks, cannot be carried out by a single decision maker because of the large amount of information processing required and the severe time constraints present in tactical situa tions. In designing an organizational structure for a team of decisionmakers, two issues need to be resolved: who receives what information and who is assigned to carry out which deci sions. The resolution of these issues depends on the hmited 0O18-9472/83/050O-384$01.0O ©1983 IEEE Abstract-An analytical model of a team of well-trained human de cisionmakers executing a well-defined decisionmaking task is presented. Each team member is described by a two-stage model consisting of a situation assessment (SA) and a response selection (RS) stage. An infor mation theoretic framework is used, in which bounded rationality is mod eled as a constraint on the total rate of internal processing by each decisionmaker. Optimizing and satisficing strategies are derived and their properties analyzed in terms of organizational performance and individual workload. The results are applied to the analysis of two three-person organizational designs. 
The basic assumption in designing organizations is that a given task, or set of tasks, cannot be carried out by a single decision maker because of the large amount of information processing required and the severe time constraints present in tactical situa tions. In designing an organizational structure for a team of decisionmakers, two issues need to be resolved: who receives what information and who is assigned to carry out which deci sions. The resolution of these issues depends on the hmited 0O18-9472/83/050O-384$01.0O ©1983 IEEE information processing rates of individual decisionmakers and the tempo of operations. The latter reflects the rate at which tasks are assigned to the organization and the interval allowed for their execution.
The task of the organization consists of receiving input signals and producing outputs which can be either signals or actions. Input signals may originate from one or many sources represent ing the organization's environment, and may be partitioned and allocated for processing by individual organization members. The general case can be modeled by a single vector source and a set of partitioning matrices that distribute components of the vector signal to the appropriate decisionmakers within the organization [2] · An information theoretic framework is used to model the processing which occurs within the organization. Information theoretic approaches to modeling human decisionmakers have a long history [3] . The basic departure from previous models is in the modeling of the internal processing of the inputs to produce outputs. This processing includes not only transmission or throughput but also internal coordination, blockage, and inter nally generated information. Consequently, the limitations of humans as processors of information and problem solvers are modeled as a constraint on the total processing activity. This constraint represents an interpretation of the hypothesis that decisionmakers exhibit bounded rationality [4] .
Consideration in this work is restricted to a specific class of organizations. Each team member is assumed to be assigned a specific task, whether it consists of processing inputs received from the external environment or from other team members, for which he is well trained and which he performs again and again for successively arriving inputs.
In general, the wth member of the organization can be repre sented by a two-stage model as shown in Fig. 1 . First, he may receive signals from the environment that he processes in the situation assessment (SA") stage to determine or select a particu lar value of the variable z n that denotes the situation. He may communicate his assessment of the situation to other members and he may receive their assessments in return. This supplemen tary information may be used to modify his assessment, i.e., it may lead to a different value of z n . Possible alternatives of action are evaluated in the response selection (RS") stage. The outcome of this process is the selection of a local action or decision response y n that may be communicated to other team members or may form all or part of the organization's response. A com mand input from other decisionmakers may affect the selection process.
The overall mapping between the organization's input and output is determined by the individual internal choices made by each team member. The relative frequencies with which these choices are made by the decisionmakers, i.e., their internal deci sion strategies, are used to form the organizational decision strategy. Because of the interactions of decisionmakers, the total activity of each decisionmaker, as well as the organizational performance, is dependent on the organizational decision strategy. For each such strategy, there corresponds a point in perfor mance-workload space; the locus of all such points is characteris tic of the organizational structure. Once the locus has been constructed, it is then possible to analyze the effect of bounded rationality constraints, which exist on individual members, on the organization's ability to accomplish its task when either optimiz ing or "satisficing [4] " performance is of interest.
In the next section the model of the organization is presented, including the specific model of the team member, the specifica tion of team interactions, and the definition of organizational decision strategy. In Section III, the properties of the organiza tional locus in performance-workload space are analyzed and illustrated by considering two specific three-person organizations.
II. TEAMS OF DECISIONMAKERS

Model of Individual Member
The complete realization of the model for the nth decision maker (DM) in a team of Ν DM's, who is interacting with other organization members and with the environment, is shown in Fig.  2 . The detailed description and analysis of this model, as well as its relationship to previous work, notably that of Drenick [5] , and Froyd and Bailey [6] , has been presented in [1] . Therefore the exposition here will be abbreviated; the reader is referred to [1] for a complete discussion of the model.
Let the organization receive from the environment a vector of symbols, X. The DM receives x" which is a noisy measurement of a partition, x", of X. The vector x n takes values from a known finite alphabet according to the probability distribution p(x n ). Two information theoretic quantities that describe the input to and its subsequent processing by a particular DM are entropy [7] , defined for a variable χ as X and measured in bits per symbol, and entropy of a variable ζ conditioned on knowledge of another variable x:
χ ζ A third quantity, mutual information, derives from the two aforementioned quantities:
Equations (l)-(3) and their extensions to multiple dimensions form the fundamental basis for the modeling framework. The quantity H(x") can also be interpreted as the uncertainty regarding which value the random variable x n will take. If input symbols are generated every τ seconds on the average, then τ, the mean symbol interarrival time, is a description of the tempo of operations [8] .
The first part of the situation assessment (SA) stage consists of a finite number U" of procedures or algorithms f" that the wth DM can choose from to process the measurement x" and obtain the assessed situation z". The internal decisionmaking in this stage is the choice of algorithm //' to process x". Therefore each algorithm is considered to be active or inactive, depending on the internal decision w". In this work, it is assumed that the algo rithms //' are deterministic. This implies that once the input is known and the algorithm choice is made, all other variables in the first part of the SA stage are known. Furthermore, because no learning takes place during the performance of a sequence of tasks, the successive values taken by the variables of the model are uncorrelated, i.e., the model is memoryless.
The vector variable z°" denotes the supplementary SA received from the other members of the organization; in general, zon = [^^...^(«-Π^^+Ο^.,^Λ'^' (4) where z' n represents the supplementary input from DM' to DM" and can be a vector variable itself. The specific definition of z on , including the existence of a given z' n element, is dependent on the particular organization structure. The variable z on combines with the elements of z" to produce z". The variables z" and z n are of the same dimension and take values from the same alphabet.
Integration of the SA's is accomplished by the deterministic algorithm A n , which constitutes the second part of the SA stage. The supplementary situation inputs z m from DM" to DM 7 are produced as outputs of the first part of the SA stage, and together they form the vector z no . Command inputs to DM" are represented by v on which is defined analogously to z on . If there is no command input vector v on from other organization members, then the response selection strategy p(v"\z") specifies the selection of one of the algorithms h" that map z n into the output y". The existence of a command input v on modifies the decisionmaker's choice v n . A final choice v" is obtained from the function b n (v n , v on ). The latter defines a protocol according to which the command is used, i.e., the values of v" determined by b"(v", v°") reflect the degree of option restriction effected by the command. The overall process of mapping the assessed situation z n and the command input v on into the final choice v" is depicted by algorithm B n in Fig. 2 . The result of this process is a response selection strategyp(v n \z", v on ) in place of p(v"\z").
Four aggregate quantities characterize the information process ing activity within DM".
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The expression for G% shows that it depends on the two internal strategies p(u") and p(v"\z") even though a command input may exist. This implies that the command input v on mod ifies the DM's internal decision after p(v"\z") has been de termined.
In the expressions defining the system coordination, p" is the probability that algorithm ff has been selected for processing the input x n and p" is the probability that algorithm h" has been selected, i.e., u" = i and v" = j. The quantities g c represent the internal coordinations of the corresponding algorithms and de pend on the distribution of their respective inputs; the quantities a", a 1 -"*-1 are the number of internal variables of the algorithms ff and h", respectively. Finally, the quantity Η is the entropy of a random variable that can take one of two values with probabil ity/?:
Equations (5)-(8) together determine the total activity G n of the decisionmaker according to the partition law of information [9] , i.e.,
where G n can be alternatively evaluated as the sum of the marginal uncertainties of each system variable.
The quantity G n may be interpreted as the total information processing activity of the system and therefore it can serve as a measure of the workload of the organization member in carrying out his decisionmaking task.
Team Interactions
In order to define an organizational structure, it is necessary to specify exactly the interactions of each decisionmaker. A de cisionmaker is said to interact with the environment when he receives inputs directly from sources or when he produces outputs that are all or part of the organization's output. The internal interactions consist of receiving inputs from other DM's, sharing situation assessments, receiving command inputs, and producing outputs that are either inputs or commands to other DM's. If these interactions are shown graphically in the form of a directed graph, then the organizational forms being considered have di rected graphs which do not contain any cycles or loops. The resulting decisionmaking organizations are defined as having acyclical information structures. This restriction in the structure of the organizations is introduced to avoid deadlock and also mes sages circulating within the organization.
To illustrate the types of information-processing and de cisionmaking organizations that can be modeled and analyzed, a simple example has been constructed based on aspects of the problem of organizing batteries of surface-to-air missiles. Let the trajectory of a target be defined by an ordered pair of points located in a rectangle that represents a two-dimensional (flat) sector of airspace. From the ordered pair, the speed and direction of flight of the target can be determined. On the basis of that information, the organization should respond by firing either a slow or a fast surface-to-air missile or by not firing at all. It is assumed that the size of that sector, the frequency of the arrival of targets, and the response time of the weapons systems are such that three units are needed, i.e., it is necessary to design a three-member organization to accomplish the task. Two such organizational structures will be considered. This is done in order to show the variety of interactions possible, and also to provide an illustration of the usefulness of the comparison of organiza tional characteristics in performance-workload space, as dis cussed in the next section.
The first structure, Organization A, is a parallel structure with lateral links, and is defined as follows. The rectangular sector is divided into three equal subsectors and a decisionmaker is as signed to each one. Each DM is capable of observing only the points that appear in his subsector. He can assess the situation, i.e., estimate the trajectory, and select the response, i.e., which weapons to fire, for targets with trajectories totally within his subsector. This is the case when both points that define the target are within his subsector. Since it is possible for trajectories to "straddle" the subsector boundaries, it is necessary that SA information be shared. Thus, DM 1 and DM 2 share information that relates to their common boundary. Similarly, DM 2 and DM 3 share information that relates to targets that cross their common boundary. To keep -the example computationally simple, the situation assessment: stages of DM 1 and DM 3 are assumed to contain a single algorithm /•"; that of DM 2 contains two algo rithms, / 2 and / 2 2 : In contrast, the response selection stage of DM 2 contains a single algorithm h 2 , while the RS stages of DM 1 and DM 3 contain two algorithms h\ and h\, η -1,3. Therefore, the internal decision strategies arep(u 2 ) 9 p(v ] \z { ), andp(b 3 \z 3 ). The detailed structure of this organization is shown in Fig. 3 . Note that the interactions defined by the information structure exhibit no loops or cycles. In particular j consider the SA informa tion shared between DM 1 and DM 2 . The variables z 1 and ζ 12 are generated as a result of DM 1 's processing of JC 1 . Similarly, ζ 2 and ζ 21 are produced by DM 2 . Once DM 2 has forwarded χ 21 to DM 1 , the final assessment z 1 can be determined using A 1 . DM 2 determines his value of ζ 2 after receiving ζ 12 , ζ 32 and after producing z 2 . While precise timing is not explicitly required, it is implicit in that a particular stage of processing cannot be com pleted until all the requisite input variables are received. Further more, it is assumed that the overall input-output processing of the organization can be accomplished on the average within the mean interarrival time τ.
The second organizational structure, Organization B, incorpo rates a decisionmaker who has a supervisory role. It is defined as follows: the rectangular sector is divided into two equal subsectors for which DM 1 , and DM 3 are responsible for assessing the SA between themselves; however, data from the area adjacent to the boundary between DM 1 and DM 3 are transmitted to the coordinator or supervisor, DM 2 , who resolves conflicts and as signs targets either to DM 1 or to DM 3 as appropriate. This is accomplished through command inputs v 2i and v 23 from the coordinator to the two commanders. They in turn exercise their response y l and y 3 , respectively. Again, for computational sim plicity, it is assumed that DM 1 and DM 3 have a single algorithm f n for their SA stage and two algorithms h" and h\ for the RS stage. The coordinator, DM 2 , has an algorithm A 2 for processing the assessed situations ζ 12 and ζ 32 and two algorithms, h 2 and A 2 , in the RS stage. The internal decision strategies are p(v l \z l ), p(v 2 \z 2 ), and p(v 3 \z 3 ).
The structure of this organization is shown in Fig. 4 . Again, note that the information structure is indeed acyclical.
The information theoretic descriptions of the decisionmakers in the Organizations A and Β are obtained by specialization of (5)- (8) . In addition to the substitution of the appropriate values of U", V", a" y etc., it is also necessary to account for the absence of entire subsystems. This can be accomplished as follows. An information theoretic expression which involves variables with zero uncertainty is unchanged when those variables are eliminated, since knowledge of their value can provide no information about other variables. In the present context, the absence of a variable or set of variables is taken to imply that the uncertainty associ- 
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Organization Decision Strategies
As discussed earlier, each decisionmaker is assumed, in general, to make an internal choice in each stage of processing. These choices give rise to situation assessment and response selection strategies. Let an internal decision strategy for DM" be defined as pure, if both the SA strategy p(u n ) and the RS strategy p(v"\z n ) are pure, i.e., an algorithm f" is selected with probabil ity one and an algorithm h" is selected also with probability one when the situation is assessed as being z" = z:
D" k " = {p(u" = r)= \;p(v"
= s\z" = z)= 1} (15) for some r, some s, and for each ζ element of the alphabet Z", where k" is an index on the pure strategies. There are K" possible pure internal strategies for each decisionmaker:
where U n is the number of f" algorithms in the SA stage, V" is the number of h" algorithms in the RS stage and M n is the dimension of the set Z". This definition of M n represents the extreme case in terms of strategy enumeration. A more likely alternative is that the pure response selection strategies are condi tioned on whether z" falls into a subset of Z", thus collapsing many pure strategies into a single one. Then M n can be interpre ted in (16) as the number of subsets of Z", or zones of indif- ference [5] . In contrast to the pure internal strategies, all other internal strategies are mixed [10] and are obtained as convex combinations of pure strategies:
A set of pure strategies, one for each DM, defines a pure strategy for organization:
Independent internal decision strategies for each DM, whether pure or mixed, induce a behavioral strategy [10] for the organiza tion:
There exist Κ pure organizational strategies where
/ = ι
Given a behavioral strategy (19) , it is then possible to compute the total processing activity G for each DM":
<7" = <7"(Δ).
For the structures at hand, the specific values of £/, K, and Μ for each DM" have been chosen as given in Table I . Note that corresponding DM's have the same number of pure strategies, and that while ζ", η = 1,3, has analphabet size much greater than two, only two partitions of Z", i.e., two zones of indif ference, were chosen for purposes of algorithm selection. From (19)- (21) it is evident that the value of G" depends on every other team member's internal strategy as a consequence of the existence of interactions between decisionmakers. These inter actions are determined by the structure of the organization. Thus the total activity of individual DM's is subject to influence or control by other DM's. Direct control is possible through com mand inputs. For example, DM 2 in Organization Β exerts a direct control in his supervisory role over DM 1 and DM 3 . Indi rect control, on the other hand, is exerted in Organization A by DM 2 on DM 1 and DM 3 in the following way. The internal choice made by DM 2 , w 2 , affects the value of ζ which in turn affects the values of z 1 and z 3 . Since DM 1 and DM 3 make their response selection internal choices based on their respective final assessments through p(v"\z n ), DM 2 's choice of u 2 is indeed an indirect influence.
The interpretation of the expression for total activity implied by (21) is particularly useful in modeling the bounded rationality constraint for each decisionmaker and in analyzing the organiza tion's performance in the performance-workload space.
III. BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The qualitative notion that the rationality of a human de cisionmaker is not perfect, but is bounded, has been modeled as a constraint on the total activity G: where τ is the mean symbol interarrival time and F" is the maximum rate of information processing that characterizes de cisionmaker n. This constraint implies that the decisionmaker must process his inputs at a rate that is at least equal to the rate with which they arrive. For a detailed discussion of this particular model of bounded rationality see Boettcher and Levis [ 1 ] . As stated earlier, the task of the organization has been modeled as receiving inputs X. The organization's actual response y can be compared to the desired response Y using a function d(y, Y). The expected value of the cost can be obtained by averaging over all possible inputs. This value, computed as a function of the organization's decision strategy Δ, can serve as a performance index /. The procedure for evaluating the performance of an organization is shown in Fig. 5 .
The information obtained from evaluating the performance of a specific organizational structure and the associated decision strategies can be used by the designer in defining and allocating sub tasks (selecting the partitioning matrices π"), in changing the number and contents of the situation assessment and response selection algorithms and in redesigning the interactions between the DM's. As an aid to the design process, the designer can formulate and solve two problems: (1) the determination of the strategies that minimize J ana (2) the determination of the set of strategies for which J < /.
The first problem is one of optimization while the latter is formulated so as to obtain satisficing strategies with respect to a performance threshold /. Since the bounded rationality con straint for all DM's depends on τ, the admissible internal deci sion strategies of each DM will also depend on the tempo of operations. The unconstrained case can be thought of as the limiting case when τ -> oo.
Solutions of the optimization and satisficing problems can be depicted graphically in the Ν + 1 dimensional performanceworkload space (/, G\ G 2 ,-· ·, G N ). The locus of the admissible (N + l)-tuples is determined by analyzing the functional depen dence of the organizational performance J and the total activity G n of each decisionmaker DM" on the organization's strategy Δ.
For Organizations A and Β the performance-workload space is four-dimensional, namely (/, G\ G 2 , <7 3 ). The G" of each de cisionmaker is a convex function of the Δ, (19) , in the sense that 
The performance index of the organization can also be ob tained as a function of Δ. Corresponding to each ΔΑ.ιΑ 2A 3 is a value J k \ k 2 k i of the performance index. Since any organization strategy being considered is a weighted sum of pure strategies, (19) , the organization's performance can be expressed as
Ph- (25) Equations (23) and (25) are parametric in the probabilities η = 1,2,3. The locus of all admissible (J,G\G 2 ,G 3 ) quadrup lets can be obtained by constructing first all binary variations between pure strategies; each binary variation defines a line in the four-dimensional space (/, G 1 , G 2 , G 3 ). Then successive bi nary combinations of mixed strategies are considered until all possible strategies are accounted for. The resulting locus can be projected on the two-dimensional spaces (/, G") as shown in [1] in order to analyze the locus of a single decisionmaker. In the present context, projection of the organizational loci on the three-dimensional space (/, G\G 2 ) is practical and convenient because in both cases the properties of DM 3 are analogous to those of DM 1 .
Bounded rationality constraints, (22) , can be realized in the performance-workload space by constructing planes of constant G for each DM. For example, the constraint for DM" is defined by a plane that is normal to the G" axis and intersects it at G" = F"T. For fixed values of F N , the bounded rationality con straint is inversely proportional to the tempo of operations. As the tempo becomes faster, i.e., the interarrival time τ becomes shorter, G" becomes smaller, and consequently, a smaller part of the locus satisfies the constraint.
Solutions of the satisficing problem can be characterized as the subset of feasible solutions for which the performance measure /(Δ) is less than or equal to a threshold value /. This condition also defines a plane in the performance-workload space that is normal to the J axis and intersects it at J. All points on the locus on or below this plane which also satisfy the bounded rationality constraint for each decisionmaker in the organization are satisfic ing solutions.
In order to compute the performance of each organization and total activity G n of each DM", it is necessary to specify the probability distribution of the targets, all the algorithms / and h, the algorithms A and Β and a table of correct responses for each possible target. Then, each admissible pure strategy of the organi zation is identified. The construction technique described in [1] is used to obtain the locus of all the feasible (J, G 1 , G 2 , G 3 ) quadruplets.
Consider first the individual performance-workload locus for each DM in each one of the two alternative organizational structures. The three loci for each organization are obtained by projecting the (/, G 1 , G 2 , G 3 ) locus on each of the three (/, G") planes, respectively. The results for Organization A are shown in Figs. 6(a),(b),(c); those of Organization Β in Figs. 7(a), (b) , (c). The index of performance / is computed as a weighted probabil ity of error, with highest cost assigned for missing a target, i.e., doing nothing, and a lesser cost assigned for choosing the inap propriate weapon in response. For the particular source chosen, the maximum J is 5.76 while the minimum is zero; the latter implies a perfect matching of responses to targets by the organi zation. The total activity G" is measured in bits/symbol. The two sets have been drawn at the same scale to allow for direct comparisons.
In Organization A, the value of / ranges from 3.9 to 4.3 units. Decisionmakers DM 1 and DM 3 have very similar, but not identi cal loci. The difference in the loci is due to asymmetries in the input, i.e., H(x l ) =*= H(x 3 ). Note that their total activity G ranges between 22 and 35 bits/symbol.
The performance-workload locus of DM 2 , however, is some what different: G ranges from 31 to 51 bits and for a fixed G there are, in general, two ranges of possible values of J. In this example, the particular range in which DM 2 , and hence the organization, falls into is determined by the internal choice of DM 2 , i.e., his selection of either f 2 or f 2 . Thus DM 2 exerts a primary influence on the organization's performance; he occupies a critical position in this structure. The loci of all three DM's exhibit the properties discussed in [1] . The optimal performance is achieved with a pure strategy when there are no bounded rationality constraints. The existence of such a constraint would be shown by a line of constant G with all feasible loci points to the left (lower G) of the line. If, for example, the constraint was the same for all three DM's, namely G" < G r = 40 bits/symbol, then none of the admissible organization strategies would over load DM 1 and DM 3 ; however, DM 2 would be overloaded for some of the strategies. By convention, only the organization strategies that do not overload any one of the organization's members are considered feasible.
Comparison of the three loci for the decisionmakers in Organi zation Β indicates that their loci are very similar: the organiza tion's performance ranges between 2.4 and 4.0 units. The total activity level for DM 1 and DM 3 is between 30 and 45 bits/sym bol. Again, the differences in the two loci are due to asymmetries in the subtasks (inputs) assigned to each DM. The coordinator, DM 2 , has a much lower workload; his total activity ranges between 15 and 30 bits/symbol. This is a consequence of not having to process external inputs directly (no algorithms /), but only having to resolve ambiguities at the boundary between the sectors of DM 1 and DM 3 . In this case, if the bounded rationality constraints are set at G r = 40, they will restrict the choice of strategies by DM 1 and DM 3 and hence the organization's strate gies.
If the two sets of loci are compared with each other, it becomes apparent that Organization Β has the ability to perform better than Organization A. In the absence of bounded rationality constraints, Β would be the preferred design. This would be especially true if there were a satisficing constraint that required a minimum organization performance, such as / less than three.
These results could be seen best by considering the comparison of the two (/, G\ G 2 , G 3 ) loci and the associated bounded ra tionality constraints. Since the performance-workload character istics of DM 1 and DM 3 are essentially the same in each organiza tion, the four-dimensional locus has been projected into the (./, G\ G 2 ) space. The two loci,_Z A and L B , are shown in Fig. 8 .
The satisficing condition, J/, is shown as a plane parallel to the (G 1 , G 2 ) plane intersecting the / axis at 3.0. The bounded rationality constraints for DM 1 and DM 2 are planes parallel to the (/, G") planes at 4Q bits/symbol. It is clear from the figure that the^ choice of preferred organiza tional structure to carry out the assigned organizational task depends on the values of the bounded rationality constraints and the satisficing threshold /. If the satisficing constraint is / = 3.0, then the design represented by Organization A is not an effective one; the organization cannot perform the task. However, there are many strategies that the decisionmakers in Organization Β can use to carry out the task without overload.
The evaluation of the two designs has been carried out in a qualitative manner using the geometric relationships between the various loci in the performance-workload space. A quantitative approach to the evaluation and comparison of alternative designs is the subject of current research.
IV. CONCLUSION
An analytical approach to modeling and analyzing structures of information-processing and decisionmaking organizations has been presented. The methodology, developed for teams of de cisionmakers with acyclic interactions, was illustrated using two three-person organizational structures. Implications for design were considered by examination of each organization's loci in performance-workload space. 
Subjective Evaluation Using Expert Judgment: An Application
F. PERRY SIOSHANSI Abstract-Objective evaluations based on analytical techniques are of limited value in the absence of specific information about some of the key parameters. A quantitative evaluation procedure is developed based on the subjective judgment of a group of experts. The methodology is used to identify plug designs with a high likelihood of satisfactory performance for a nuclear waste repository.
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Large quantities of radioactive waste, the by-products and end-products of the nuclear power industry and defense-related programs, have been accumulating in the U.S. since the mid-1940's [l]- [3] . So far these wastes have been stored at several "tem porary" repositories around the country pending a final decision on, and the development of, one or more acceptable " permanent" repositories [4] . These nuclear wastes have to be properly con tained and effectively isolated from the biosphere for thousands of years because of the long half-lives of some of the radioactive isotopes.
The issue of nuclear waste management and disposal has assumed a new sense of urgency [5] - [10] .
Disposing of radioactive nuclear waste safely and permanently is the final step in closing the nuclear fuel cycle. It will also be a critical factor in determining public acceptance of nuclear power for the nation's still growing energy needs. [11] Among the most promising alternatives under consideration is storing the waste in repositories in deep stable geologic forma tions [12] . Basalt, granite, and dry salt formations are prime candidates. In order to construct a subsurface repository, manmade openings will be required including boreholes for explora tion, access shafts and tunnels, and storage areas [11] , [2] . When the repository is decommissioned, these boreholes will have to be sealed or plugged to prevent the migration of the stored waste to the biosphere for thousands of years. To preserve the integrity of the repository, numerous " plugging schemes" 1 composed of mul tiple materials are being considered [13] , [1] . Needless to say, every effort must be made to identify potential failure modes and escape routes and to take appropriate mitigation measures. To attain a conservative margin of safety, a high degree of design redundancy such as multiple barriers must be provided.
One of the programs currently under way is the Basalt Waste Isolation Program (BWIP) whose objective is to "locate sites and assess the feasibility for developing a repository for terminal nuclear waste storage at depths in the Columbia River basalts" [14] . As part of this program, Woodward-Clyde Consultants (WCC) was to [14] "provide a preconceptual design for a plug 'The term "plug scheme" is used to denote a complete plugging system consisting of material specifications, design configurations, plug placement machinery and techniques. Examples may be found in the Appendix and [19] . system in man-made openings that will assure containment of radioactive waste after closure of the repository."
The present correspondence is an excerpt from the study performed at WCC to evaluate a number of preconceptual plug designs for an underground nuclear waste repository [15] . The object of the evaluation was to identify plug schemes with a high likelihood of performing successfully under actual loading condi tions. Specifically, a methodology was to be developed to evaluate alternative plug designs based on the professional judgment of a group of experts. These "preferred" plug schemes would then undergo additional technical analysis, material testing, and de tailed engineering design for further evaluation and final selec tion. A more detailed description of the problem and results obtained may be found in [15] .
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
The primary function of a plug scheme is containment of hazardous waste material and its isolation from the biosphere for long periods of time. Hazardous waste material may gradually find their way to the biosphere either through the plug(s) or through the basalt host rock. It is assumed that radionuclide migration through the host rock will take place at such a slow rate as to make the latter "failure" mode virtually impossible. Such an assumption presumes that the repository is placed at great depth and that the host rock does not have large and continuous fractures. In any case, the analysis in the remainder of this study is concerned with radionuclide migration through the plug and its immediate environment.
At the time the present study was performed, no decision had been made about the exact layout, depth, or configuration of the underground repository. The plug schemes designed and evaluated were based on few scant and preliminary specifications (e.g., the diameter of the boreholes was specified as ranging from 5 cm for exploration holes to 10 m for large access shafts and tunnels). Furthermore, very few hard data were available on in-situ material properties, placement machinery, or techniques, nor were accep table plug performance criteria specified. The term "preconcep tual" is used in referring to the plug designs considered to emphasize their preliminary and tentative basis.
Because of the preconceptual nature of plug designs, determin istic analysis of alternative plug schemes are of limited value. For this reason, it was decided to complement the analytical evalua tion techniques with qualitative results. The purpose of the judg mental evaluation was to provide an independent and qualitative assessment of the relative merits and disadvantages of alternative plug schemes, while specifically recognizing the limitations that existed on the quality and quantity of data available at the time. The evaluation was to be based on the "collective" judgment of a number of professionals with expertise in various aspects of tunneling, plugging, material properties, geotechnical design, and construction techniques.
The main objective was to develop a simple and operational methodology that would discriminate among alternative schemes, those with a high likelihood of performing successfully under in-situ placement and loading conditions for thousands of years. It was felt that such an evaluation would be useful because it would either reinforce the conclusions derived from analytical techniques (i.e., if both approaches arrive at the same general conclusions), or because it would force a careful revaluation of the two approaches (i.e., if the results were contradictory) until a mutually supportive conclusion could be reached.
Despite its fundamentally qualitative and subjective basis, it was decided to make the judgmental evaluation structured in the sense that it would use the available information systematically. Several other desirable criteria were also to be incorporated in the 0018-9472/83/0500-391 $01.00 ©1983 IEEE
